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INSPECTION OF STOCK LEDGERS AND VOTING LISTS
by
Frank G. Newman*
M ODERN corporate management is becoming increasingly aware
of the importance of stockholder lists-that is, the records of
the names, addresses, and holdings of the stockholders of a corpora-
tion. Because of the growing interest in these normally obscure docu-
ments, this article presents an analysis of the rights and responsibili-
ties of the persons who readily have access to the lists and of the
persons who under certain circumstances may have access to the lists.
Undoubtedly the increasing interest in stockholder lists is due
to the widespread practice of proxy voting. Theoretically, voting
rights are made incidents of stock ownership in order to permit
the selection of corporate management by the persons having the
greatest financial interests in the corporation. However, this theory
breaks down in the case of large publicly-held corporations since the
persons having the greatest aggregation of financial interests are
usually a host of small investors, few of whom have sufficient indivi-
dual interest in the corporation to make them particularly con-
cerned with the exercise of their voting rights. As a result, in a
publicly-held corporation only management and a handful of curious
shareholders attend stockholder meetings and exercise their right to
vote in person. Consequently, these meetings must necessarily be
controlled by the exercise of proxies which have been solicited from
the numerous, non-attending small investors.! It follows then, that
in order to solicit the proxy votes necessary to control a publicly-
* B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; LL.B. Yale University; Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
These proxies may well represent shares which are several times in number the shares
represented by the stockholders present in person. A good example is the Chrysler Cor-
poration's 1961 annual stockholders' meeting. The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1961, p. 24,
col. 1, had the following to say about the meeting:
Chrysler Corp.'s management was re-elected at the annual meeting, as ex-
pected, but not before it heard more than two hours of denunciation by angry
stockholders.
More than 30 stockholders spoke at the meeting, which lasted nearly four
hours. Only a handful had anything good to say about management in general,
and L. L. Colbert, chairman and president, in particular.
Time after time calls from the floor for Mr. Colbert's resignation were
greeted by cheers and applause from the crowd which numbered about 800.
The meeting was held at the concern's training center in the Detroit suburb
of Center Line. Stockholders overflowed the 500-seat auditorium and filled
the adjoining 300-seat cafeteria.
Stockholders knew before they started talking that their comments would
have little effect on the election. Mr. Colbert announced when the meeting
opened that management held proxies for 7,046,288 of the auto maker's
8,915,005 shares outstanding.
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held corporation, it is essential that management, or any dissident
anti-management groups, have access to the names and addresses of
all stockholders. Hence, the stockholder list becomes of prime
importance.
Normally, the names and addresses of stockholders from whom
proxies may be obtained are known only to corporate management.
Consequently, the stockholder list has become a zealously guarded
secret of incumbent management and a frequently sought-after tool
of "outside" shareholders who seek to break or alter the control of
management. In addition, the stockholder list is often used as a
means of corporate acquisition, that is, one corporation will use the
list in order to make offers to the listed shareholders to purchase or
exchange its shares for the shares of the other corporation.
The courts have consistently recognized that directors of a cor-
poration have an unqualified right to inspect that corporation's books
and records, including the stockholder list.' In addition, several states
by statute have conferred that right upon judgment creditors.' How-
ever, the most frequently encountered request to inspect a stock-
holder list comes from the stockholder himself. Accordingly, this
article discusses inspections and attempted inspections by stock-
holders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. At Common Law
Under the common law a stockholder is entitled to inspect cor-
porate books and records, including the stock ledger, for a proper
purpose at a proper time and place.' This right of inspection arises
from the shareholders' equitable ownership of the assets of a corpora-
tion and their corresponding right to receive reliable information
concerning the financial condition of that corporation and the con-
2See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951). But cf. State ex rel. Paschall v. Scott, 41
Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952), where a director was denied inspection because his
purpose was hostile to the corporation's interests, and Fulle v. White Metal Mfg. Co., 13
N.J. Misc. 591, 180 Atl. 231 (Sup. Ct. 1935), where a former director-officer was denied
access to the books because his purpose was to be reinstated as an employee or to have
his stock interest liquidated at a high price.
aSee Ark. Stat. S 64-219 (1957); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.105
(1959); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 294:94 (1955); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953); N.Y.
Stock Corp. Law § 10.
" See Ballantine, Corporations § 159-160 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 2214 (1931); Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice 5§ 611, 612 (1959); 18 C.J.S.
Corporations 5 502 (1939); 13 Am. Jur. Corporations § 432 (1938). See Annot., 22 A.L.R.
24 (1923), supplemented in 43 A.L.R. 783 (1926), 59 A.L.R. 1373 (1929), 80 A.L.R.
1502 (1932), 174 A.L.R. 262 (1948). See also Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951); Regala,
Nature of the Rights of Stockholders to Examine the Books of the Corporation, 21 Phil.
L.J. 74 (1941).
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duct of its business affairs.5 However, since corporate records are in
the physical custody or control of incumbent corporate officers, who
could possibly be removed through the use of information gleaned
from such records, the enforcement of the stockholders' right of
inspection of the stockholder list has seldom been the matter of a
simple request. Consequently, a large number of suits have arisen
concerning the propriety or impropriety of attempted inspections.
B. The Early Statutes
During the latter part of the nineteenth century management's
resistance to attempted inspections of corporate records by share-
holders became so notorious that most state legislatures enacted
statutes which made the right of inspection absolute.' However, in
spite of the legislative intent, the courts frequently held that the
statutes were merely an affirmance of the common law. Accordingly,
the right of inspection was limited to a reasonable or proper purlose,
as well as to reasonable times and places.!
Some of the early statutes permitted the right of inspection only
of certain specified records.' In these situations the courts liberalized
the statutes by holding that in addition to the statutory right to
inspect specific records, the shareholder also had the common law
right to inspect other books and records not mentioned in the
statutes.9
II. THE MODERN INSPECTION STATUTES
Some thirteen states still have statutes which limit the right of
inspection to specific records."0 These statutes, if literally interpreted,
'Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); State ex rel. Boldt v. St. Cloud Mill Pro-
ducers' Ass'n, 200 Minn. 1, 273 N.W. 603 (1937); State ex rel. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston
Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946); Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671 (1958).
8Representative of such statutes of this era was Article 1328, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. (1925), which provided:
They shall cause a record to be kept of all stock subscribed and transferred,
and of all business transactions. Their books and records shall at all reason-
able times be open to the inspection of any stockholder.
7See Birmingham News v. State ex rel. Dunston, 207 Ala. 440, 93 So. 25 (1921);
Guaranty Old Line Life Co. v. McCallum, 97 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936-Dallas)
no writ hist.
'See Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. ch. 215, § 1 (1911); Del. Code Ann. § 1919 (1915); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 49, § 33 (1944).
9See State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 Ati. 861 (1913);
State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257 (1926); Holdsworth
v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 143 Maine 56, 55 A.2d 130 (1947); Albee v. Lamson & Hubbard
Corp., 320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946). See also Note, 41 Va. L. Rev. 237 (1955).
" Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-175 (1956); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 221 (1953);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 172-40 (1955); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 53, § 34 (1954); Md. Ann. Code
art. 23, § 51(1957); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.215 (1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 15-1001
(1947); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14:5-1 (1937); S.C. Code § 12-263 (1952); S.D. Code § 11.0802
1962]
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would grant to the shareholders an absolute right of inspection of
the stockholder list. Accordingly, most of the states have adopted
modern corporate laws which either expressly limit the right of
inspection, or name specific defenses to the enforcement thereof, or
both." In addition, some statutes provide penalties for non-com-
pliance." It is the primary purpose of these modern inspection laws
to make it less likely that reasonable requests for inspection will
be denied.
Inspection statutes are now of two types: (1) those which provide
for the inspection of general books and records, including stock
ledgers, and (2) those which provide only for the inspection of lists
of shareholders entitled to vote at the annual meeting. Each type
will be discussed separately below.
A. The General Inspection Statutes
The Illinois statute" was probably the earliest comprehensive
statute on the general right of shareholders to inspect books and
(1939); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.44 (1956); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 5 461 (1957);
W. Va. Code ch. 31, art. 1, § 3086 (1961). In contrast to the early statutes, some modern
statutes with express restrictions on the right of inspection have been construed more
liberally by the courts than the early statutes which contained no express limitations. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co., supra note 9.
"See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(46) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54
(Supp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-175 (1956); Ark. Stat. § 64-219 (1957); Cal.
Corp. Code 55 3003, 3005 (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Rev. 55 33-307, -333, -334 (1961); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 220, 221 (1953);
D.C. Code Ann. § 29-920 (1961); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1862
(Supp. 1961); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 172-40 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144 (1947);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-210 (1960); Iowa Bus. Corp.
Act § 30 (1959); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-3310 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 271.395
(1960); La. Rev. Stat. § 12:38 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 53, 5 34 (1954); Md.
Ann. Code art. 23, §§ 49-51 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 155, 5 22 (1959); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 21.35 (Supp. 1961); Minn. Stat. § 301.34 (1945); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.215
(1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 15-1001, -1002, 94.2310 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. 5
78.105 (1959); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 294:92, :94 (1955); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14:5.1
(1937); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 55-37, -38 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.37
(Anderson Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.70, .71 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.246
(1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-308 (1958); S.C. Code § 12-263 (1952); S.D. Code
§§ 11.0802-.0804 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-308 (1955); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann.
art. 2.44 (1956); Utah Bus. Corp. Act § 16-10-47 (1962); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, 55
461, 462 (1957); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-47 (1961); Wash. Rev. Code 5 23.01.380 (1961);
W. Va. Code ch. 31, art. 1, § 3086 (1961); and Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957).
" See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(46) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54
(Supp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-175 (1956); Ark. Stat. § 64-219 (1957); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144
(1947); Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954); Iowa Bus. Corp. Act § 30 (1959); Minn.
Scat. § 301.34 (1945); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 5 94.2310 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. 5
78.105 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-38 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, §
1.71 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961); Tenn. Code Ann. 5 48-308 (1955);
Utah Bus. Corp. Act § 16-10-47 (1962); Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957).
aIll. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954):
Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of account
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records (including stockholder lists). Consequently it has served
as the model for legislation in several other states, as well as for the
Model Business Corporation Act." The Illinois act requires corpora-
tions to keep accurate books and records, including records of the
shareholders' names and addresses and of the number of shares held
by each. The act authorizes inspection for any proper purpose by
shareholders who have held their shares of record for at least six
months, or who own at least five per cent of the stock of the cor-
poration. Moreover, the statute specifies defenses to actions for
inspection and provides penalties for non-compliance.
Statutes similar to the Illinois act have been adopted in thirty-one
states'" but with considerable variations. The statutes in eleven of
these states require a reasonable or proper purpose to inspect and also
and shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and board
of directors; and shall keep at its registered office or principal place of busi-
ness in this State, or at the office of a transfer agent or registrar in this State,
a record of its shareholders, giving the name and addresses of all shareholders
and the number and class of the shares held by each. Any person who shall
have been a shareholder of record or the holder of a voting trust certificate
for at least six months immediately preceding his demand or who shall be the
holder of record at least 5 per cent of all the outstanding shares of a corp-
oration, shall have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or attorney,
at any reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its books and records
of account, minutes and records of shareholders and to make extracts there-
from. A record of shareholders certified by an officer or transfer agent shall
be competent evidence in all courts of this State.
Any officer, or agent, or a corporation which shall refuse to allow any such
shareholder or such holder of a voting trust certificate, or his agent or
attorney, so to examine and make extracts from its books and records of
account, minute:, and record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall be
liable to such shareholder or such holder of a voting trust certificate in a
penalty of ten per cent of the value of the beneficial interest owned by such
voting trust certificate holder, in addition to any other damages or remedy
afforded him by law. It shall be a defense to any action for penalties under
this section that the person suing therefor has within two years sold or offered
for sale any list of shareholders of such corporation or any other corporation
or has aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders for
any such purpose, or has improperly used any information secured through
any prior examination of the books and records of account, or minutes, or
record of shareholders of such corporation or any other corporation.
Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competentjurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, irrespective of
the period of time during which such shareholder shall have been a share-
holder of recorl, and irrespective of the number of shares held by him, to
compel by mandamus or otherwise the production for examination by such
shareholder of the books and records of account, minutes, and record of
shareholders of a corporation.
14 Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 412 (1952); Garrett,
History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. Law. 1
(1950).
" The only states having no statutory provisions for inspection of corporate records by
shareholders are Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Wyoming; Georgia, Ga. Code § 22-1862(Supp. 1958), and Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-165 (1954), require only the production
of these records at a swckholders' meeting.
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expressly set forth defenses to actions for inspection." The enact-
ments in five states denote defenses but do not call for a showing
of a proper purpose.' Finally, the statutes in fifteen states require a
showing of reasonable or proper purpose but mention no defenses."
The defenses to an action for inspection which are most frequently
specified in the various statutes are: (1) that the applicant has
within the two previous years sold or offered to sell or assisted another
person in the sale of or offering for sale of a shareholder list; (2)
that he has improperly used information secured through a prior
examination of the records; and (3) that he was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand." Of course,
there are variations. In addition to the three defenses mentioned
above, the statutes of Arkansas, 0 Connecticut, 1 Florida,1 and Ten-
nessee" provide that any use of a stockholder list other than for the
protection of a stockholder's corporate interest is a defense. At the
other extreme, the Massachusetts statute sets out only two defenses:
(1) that the purpose of the applicant in obtaining a stockholder list
is to sell it, and (2) that he intends to use the list for a purpose other
than in the interest of the applicant as a stockholder or in relation
to the affairs of the corporation. 4 Finally, the Wisconsin statute in-
10 See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(44) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54
(Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 33-307
(1961); 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954); Iowa Bus. Corp. Act § 30 (1959); N.C.
Gen. Star. § 55-38 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.71
(1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957).
17 See Ark. Stat. § 64-219 (1957); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat.
78.105 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953); Tenn. Code Ann. 5 48-308 (1955).
1SSee Cal. Corp. Code § 3003 (1947); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144 (1947); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 25-210 (1960); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-3310 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 271.395
(1960); La. Rev. Stat. § 12:38 (1950); Mich. Comp. Laws § 21.35 (Supp. 1961); Minn.
Stat. § 301.34 (1945); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 924:92 (1955); Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.37
(Anderson Supp. 1961) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, 5 2852-308 (1958); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann.
art. 2.44 (1956); Utah Bus. Corp. Act § 16-10-47 (1962); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-47
(1961); Wash. Rev. Code § 23.01.380 (1961).
18These three defenses are specified in Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(46) (Supp. 1959);
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54 (Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10
(1953); Iowa Bus. Corp. Act § 30 (1959); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961); and Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957). A few states list only the
"prior sales" defense. See Ark. Stat. § 64-219 (1957); Fla. Stat. 5 608.39 (1956); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 78.105 (1959); and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953). New York extends
the period to five years and also includes the "improper purpose" defense. N.Y. Stock Corp.
Law § 10. The prior sales and improper use defenses are also specified in the following
statutes: D.C. Code Ann. 5 29-920 (1961); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 155, § 22 (1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38 (1960); Okla. Stat. tit. 18,
1.71 (1951); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-308 (1955).
20Ark. Stat. 5 64-219 (1957).
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 5 33-333 (1961).
22 Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956).
'3 Tenn. Code Ann. 5 48-308 (1955).24 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 155, § 22 (1959).
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cludes "any other meritorious defense,"'" and the Connecticut en-
actment permits as a defense any use for "speculative or trading
purposes."2
Penalties for a wrongful refusal to permit inspection are found
in most of the general inspection statutes. In fact, most of the
enactments impose a set monetary fine, which is normally around
fifty dollars." In some states a fine is payable to a complaining share-
holder," in others to the state,2 and in Nevada," New Mexico,' and
New York, 2 it is payable to both the shareholder and the state. Some
statutes are more severe. For example, failure to grant an inspection
is made a misdemeanor in Arizona," Montana, 4 New York,3 and
Utah." North Carolina not only deems it a misdemeanor for a share-
holder to improperly use the information received from an inspec-
tion,"7 but also imposes a threat of revocation of the certificate of
authority or of corporate dissolution for refusal by a corporation to
comply with a court order to produce the records.38 Furthermore, in
order to make the inspection right more effective, some states have
provided for exemplary damages at ten per cent of the value of the
shares owned by the applicant in addition to any actual damages he
has sustained.3 However, it has been held that these exemplary
2s Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957).
26 Conn. Gen. Star. Rev. § 33-333 (1961).
27The following states, in using the Model Code's provisions, adopted this amount:
Ark. Stat. § 64-219 (1957); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144
(1947); Minn. Stat. § 301.34 (1945); Nev. Rev. Star. § 78.105 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 51-2-27 (1953); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10; Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.71 (1951); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-308 (1955).
28 See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(46) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54
(Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45
(1954); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961).
" See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 10-175 (1956); Ark. Stat. S 64-219 (1957); Fla. Stat.
§ 608.39 (1956); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144 (1947); Minn. Stat. § 301.34 (1945); Nev.
Rev. Star. § 78.105 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law
§ 10; Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.71 (1951); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48.308 (1955); Utah Bus.
Corp. Act § 16-10-47 (1962).
"
0 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.105 (1959).
"1N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953).
"2 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10.
' Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-195 (1956).
'4 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.2310 (1947).
"'N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10.
86 Utah Bus. Corp. Act § 16-10-47 (1962).
3 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38 (1960).
as Ibid.
" See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21 (46) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54
(Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45
(1954); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 57.246 (1961).
Iowa, Iowa Bus. Corp. Act § 30 (1959) and Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957),
have similar provisions but limit the total amount of damages recoverable under the 10%
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damages provisions are inapplicable to a foreign corporation or to
its officers where the refusal to permit inspection has occurred out-
side of the state in which the forum is located."'
B. The Voting List Statutes
Twenty-six states' have enacted statutes (in addition to the gen-
eral inspection statutes) which require a corporation to prepare lists
of the names, addresses, and individual holdings of its shareholders.
These statutes provide for a right of inspection by any shareholder
either at the annual meeting or during some specified period of time
immediately preceding an annual meeting."'
Most of the voting list statutes have adopted the penalty provi-
sions that are set forth in the Model Act for non-compliance by
corporate officers. However, the penalties are usually in the form of
nominal fines or other equally ineffectual sanctions."' Moreover,
damages suffered by a shareholder are seldom susceptible of proof."
In contrast, if there is no substantial compliance with the Virginia
statute, then the annual stockholder meeting is to be adjourned upon
demand of any stockholder until there is substantial compliance.'"
And, in some four states if the directors fail to have the list produced
at an election meeting, they are ineligible for election to any office.""
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT
As noted above, a stockholder seeking to obtain the stockholder
list of a corporation may have three possible remedies: (1) his right
provision to $500. The Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46 also provides 10% of the value of
shares plus actual damages as the penalty.
41 Schaefer v. H. B. Green Transp. Line, Inc., 232 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1956).
4' Ala. Bus. Corp. Act § 21(48) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-37
(Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-9 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 33-333
(1961); Del. CodeAnn. tit. 8, § 219 (1953); Ga. Code § 22-905 (1936); Ill. Rev. Star. ch.
32, § 157.32 (1954); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-207(g) (1960); Iowa Bus. Corp. Act § 30
(1959); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-3309 (1949); La. Rev. Stat. § 12:38 (1950); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 21.35 (Supp. 1961); Mo. Rev. Star. § 351.255 (1949); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 21.165 (1954); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-5 (1937); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-27 (1953);
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 10; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-64 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-31
(1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.37 (Anderson Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.59
(1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. 5 57.160 (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-510 (1958);
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.27 (1956); Utah Bus. Corp. Act § 16-10-29 (1962);
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-30 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 180.29 (1957).
"' The period is usually ten days except in Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 5 33-333
(1961); Indiana, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-207(g) (1960); and Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 2852-510 (1958), where it is five days, and Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 1.59 (1951), where it is one day. Quaere as to the value of such stockholder list ten days
before the annual meeting in a publicly-held corporation.
" See Wolinsky, Shareholder Voting List Statutes-Are They Effective? 26 U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 288 (1957).
44 Ibid.
41Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-30 (1961).
4°See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 5 219 (1953); Mich. Comp. Laws S 21.35 (Supp. 1961);
Neb. Rev. Stat. 5 21.165 (1954); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14.10-5 (1937).
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under common law, (2) his right under applicable general inspection
statutes, and (3) his right under applicable voting list statutes. The
enforcement of these inspection rights has become the subject of
more litigation than any other individual right of a shareholder," for
the shareholder list has become the line of scrimmage for contests
involving incumbent management, dissident shareholders, acquisi-
tion-minded corporations, and those who have been described in cur-
rent fiction as "corporate raiders." The main problems which arise
in the enforcement of inspection rights involve: (1) necessary quali-
fications of the inspecting shareholder, (2) time and place of in-
spection, (3) proper purpose, (4) right to make extracts, and (5)
the burden of proof of the purpose. These and other related prob-
lems are discussed in the following subsections.
A. Shareholders Entitled To Inspect
General inspection statutes usually provide for a right of inspec-
tion by stockholders who have held their shares for a specified period
of time, or who own a stated percentage of the outstanding stock."
A requirement of both a holding period and a percentage of stock
has been adopted in five states4" and the District of Columbia."5 In
contrast, the voting list statutes usually make no requirement as to
the period of holding or percentage of ownership. 1
Although theoretically the holder of a small number of shares
has the same right to inspect the records as the owner of a large
bloc, it is evident that larger stockholders are more often granted
full inspection rights." This may be explained partially by the fact
that the owner of one or only a few shares often will desire inspec-
tion for an improper purpose, whereas the owner of a large number
of shares more frequently will have a reasonable purpose for seeking
inspection.
The terms "shareholders" and "stockholders," unless otherwise
provided in the statute, have, of course, been construed to include
preferred stockholders." Likewise, where stock is registered in the
4' In New York alone there have been over 400 decisions in the past twenty years. See
Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice §§ 611, 612 (1959).
"8 The Model Act requires either a six month holding period or a 57 ownership of the
outstanding shares entitled to vote. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46.
4"Idaho Code Ann. § 30-144 (1947); La. Rev. Stat. § 12:38 (1950); Md. Ann. Code
art. 23, § 51 (1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 21.35 (Supp. 1961); W. Va. Code ch. 31, art. 1,
§ 3086 (1961).
5 D. C. Code Ann. § 29-920 (1961).
" See statutes cited note 41 supra.
"*Cf. Martin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 307 N.Y. 920, 123 N.E. 2d 572 (1954);
Harrington v. Milton C. Johnson Co., 307 N.Y. 917, 123 N.E.2d 570 (1954).
" See Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1940); Indianapolis St.
Ry. v. State ex rel. Cohen, 203 Ind. 534, 181 N.E. 365 (1932); Putnam v. Slayback, 23
F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1928).
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name of the person who is the owner in fact, there is little question
that he qualifies as a "stockholder" or "shareholder." There have
been, however, considerable differences of opinion in two situations:
(1) involving equitable or beneficial owners who are not the owners
of record," and (2) involving persons who are merely nominees" or
who hold the stock in the capacity of a trustee."
The Delaware Supreme Court has construed the inspection right
to be applicable to all owners of record who meet the holding period
or percentage of ownership requirement." Also, in New York a
pledgor of stock who retains ownership subject to the pledgee's lien
is held to be entitled to inspection' provided the stock is not
registered in the pledgee's name.
In a few cases the courts have held that the stockholder seeking
inspection must be the owner in fact and not merely in name." How-
ever, at least one court has permitted an inspection by trustees who
held bare legal title," while other courts have granted the right of
inspection to the beneficial or equitable owners of stock." Inspection
has been both denied" and granted" where a stockholder has entered
into a contract for the sale of his stock.
One decision has denied the right of inspection by the holder of
a voting trust certificate except where such a holder is expressly
granted a statutory right of inspection. 5 In one New York case the
holder of a voting stock certificate was allowed to inspect corporate
" See State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 41 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (1940); Babcock
v. Chicago R.R., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N.E. 773 (1927); Browser & Co. v. State ex rel. Hines,
192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E. 57 (1922); Onjer v. Harren, 208 Iowa 1217, 227 N.W. 101 (1929);
Woodworth v. Old Second Nat'l Bank, 154 Mich. 459, 117 N.W. 893 (1908); Mateer v.
New Jersey Tel. Co., 5 N.J. Misc. 261, 136 Atl. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1927); In re Reiss, 30
Misc. 234, 62 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
5 See State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (1940).
" Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 35 Cal. App. 283, 169 Pac. 702 (1917); Taylor v. Eden
Cemetery Co., 337 Pa. 203, 10 A.2d 573 (1940).
"eState ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (1940). Thus,
in Delaware, a registered stockholder is entitled to examine the stock ledger and make a
list of stockholders, although he is a mere nominee and not the beneficial owner of the
shares.
"' Monitor Co. v. Confianza Furniture & Appliance Corp., 142 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
" This distinction was made in Neisloss v. Alleghany Corp., 141 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
'°Ralston v. Grande Ronde Hosp., 149 Ore. 45, 39 P.2d 362 (1934); State ex rel.
Moore v. Van Tassell Real Estate & Livestock Co., 53 Wyo. 89, 79 P.2d 476 (1938).
61 Taylor v. Eden Cemetery Co., 337 Pa. 203, 10 A.2d 573 (1940).
65Fiest v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 30 N.J. Super. 153, 103 A.2d 893 (1954); Mc-
Geary v. Brown, 23 S.D. 573, 122 N.W. 605 (1909).
'"State ex rel. Bulkley v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 104 La. 125, 28 So. 922 (1900);
In re Gaines, 180 N.Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd mem., 179 N.Y. Supp. 922 (App.
Div. 1920).
"Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948).
65 State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 41 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (1940).
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records under his common law right of inspection, " however, another
New York decision states that such right is to be determined by the
provisions of the voting trust agreement."
A shareholder who is entitled to inspect corporate records is en-
titled to exercise this right through an agent, attorney, or accountant
of his own choosing, and the corporation cannot dictate or control
his selection." However, the corporation does have the right to
demand evidence of the agent's authorization before it opens its
books to him for inspection.
B. Time And Place Of Inspection
A shareholder has no right to insist arbitrarily upon a particular
time or place of inspection (other than as may be specified in a voting
list statute) due to the requirements of reasonable time and proper
place."0 The definition of a reasonable time and a proper place depends
upon the particular facts in a given case and may be determined by
a court in the exercise of its discretion." Thus, in ordering an inspec-
tion a court may specify the time and place."
The right of inspection has been held not to be limited to one
occasion, but to be a continuing right subject only to the limitation
of reasonableness."3 When a shareholder seeks to inspect stockholder
lists and make extracts from them, it has been held that business
hours are reasonable hours." Also, even when a statute grants the
right of inspection "at all times," such a phrase has been construed
to mean at all reasonable times during business hours. '
Ordinarily, an inspection must be conducted so as not to interfere
with the normal business of the corporation. " It follows, then, that
the usual place of inspection is the principal business office of the
eSBaczkowska v. 2166 Operating Corp., 304 N.Y. 811, 109 N.E.2d 470 (1952).
67Brentmore Estates, Inc. v. Hotel Barbizon, Inc., 263 App. Div. 389, 33 N.Y.S.2d
331 (1942).
6' Fletcher, Private Corporations 824, 825 (perm. ed. 19 57).
e"Birmingham News v. State ex rel. Dunston, 207 Ala. 440, 93 So. 25 (1921); S. F.
Bowser & Co. v. State ex rel. Hines, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E. 57 (1922).70 Flowers v. Rotary Printing Co., 65 Ohio App. 543, 31 N.E.2d 251 (1940); Cornell v.
Nestle Le Mur Co., 65 Ohio App. 1, 29 N.E.2d 162 (1940); Ruby v. Penn Fibre Bd. Corp.,
326 Pa. 582, 192 At. 914 (1937).
71 See Ruby v. Penn Fibre Bd. Corp., supra note 70. In Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. S
351.215 (1949), the corporate by-laws may regulate inspection hours, and in South
Carolina, S.C. Code § 12-263 (1952), and West Virginia, W. Va. Code ch. 31, art. 1, §
3086 (1961), inspection is authorized by statute "at any and all times."
" See Wittnebel v. Loughman, 80 F.2d 222 (2nd Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S.
716 (1936); Rahn v. State ex rel. Weir, 137 Fla. 692, 188 So. 584 (1939).
"3 Smith v. Trumbull Farmers Gin Co., 89 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936-Waco)
no writ hist.
'
4 Schwamm v. United Nat'l Bank, 269 App. Div. 692, 53 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1945).
" Self v. Langley Mills, 123 S.C. 179, 115 S.E. 754 (1923).
76 Ruby v. Penn Fibre Bd. Corp., 326 Pa. 582, 192 At. 914 (1937).
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corporation, which office is normally located within the state of in-
corporation.77 However, a court may compel a corporation to bring
its records into the state even though they are kept outside its
borders." Of course, a court will usually balance the conveniences
of the parties in determining whether this should be done or whether
the shareholder should be required to inspect the records in the
foreign state."
C. Proper Purpose
The early English common law required that there be some par-
ticular controversy or specific dispute before the right of inspection
would be granted."0 A few of the early American decisions adopted
this principle," however, it is now generally held that the showing
of a dispute is not required." Since fraud and mismanagement are
frequently only discoverable after the books have been inspected, it
is obvious that an injustice could result from a strict application of
the common law rule. Indeed, the possibility of such an occurrence
has been assigned as one of the reasons for the widespread adoption
of statutes giving the right of inspection.83
The present rule in this country with respect to the showing of
a proper purpose is that there be a qualified shareholder who is seek-
ing to ascertain information from the company's records, in good
faith, for the protection of the interests of the corporation or his
interests as a stockholder." Therefore, any well-planned attempt
by a stockholder to obtain a stockholder list by the inspection of
corporate records should include: (1) a written request for per-
mission to make the inspection, and (2) a statement of the reasons
why such inspection is requested.
Most decisions which deal with attempts by stockholders to inspect
corporate records have been concerned primarily with the avowed
or real purpose of the stockholder."5 These decisions show that the
77 Ibid.
7 State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. 379, 77 Atd. 16 (1910);
Ross v. Robinson, 185 N.C. 548, 118 S.E. 4 (1923).
71 See Cornell v. Nestle Le Mur Co., 65 Ohio App. 1, 29 N.E.2d 162 (1940); Ruby
v. Penn Fibre Bd. Corp., 326 Pa. 582, 192 At. 914 (1937).
80 Rex v. Master & Wardens of Merchant Tailor's Co., 2 B. & Ad. 114, 109 Eng. Rep.
1086 (1831); Re Burton & Saddler's Co., 31 L.J.Q.B.(n.s.) 62 (1861).
"'See Johnson v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 Pac. 1050 (1902); In re Pierson, 28 Misc.
726, 59 N.Y. Supp. 1003, aff'd, 44 App. Div. 215, 60 N.Y. Supp. 671 (1899); Phoenix
Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa. 563, 6 At. 75 (1886).
82 See Neiman v. Templeton Kenly & Co., 294 Ill. App. 45, 50, 13 N.E.2d 290, 292
(1938); Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423, 428, 219 S.W. 191, 194 (1920).
8" Neiman v. Templeton Kenly & Co., supra note 82.
84 Yagoda's Estate v. Picture Book Toys, Inc., 157 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1956); State
ex rel. Weinberg v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 21 Wash. 451, 58 Pac. 584 (1899).
8See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d I1 (1951).
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most prevalent purposes for inspection usually concern: (a) com-
munication with other shareholders, (b) curiosity or harassment of
management, (c) use by the shareholder for commercial or specula-
tive reasons, and (d) use by another corporation or competitor.
These four purposes are more fully analyzed below.
1. Communication With Other Shareholders
a. Concerning Mismanagement or a Change in Management.-With
increasing frequency, litigation is the end result of a refusal by man-
agement to allow inspection of stock lists where the stated or obvious
purpose is to depose management and gain control of the corporation.
Unfortunately for management, most of the recent cases recognize
that shareholders are entitled to inspect stockholder lists for the
purpose of proxy solicitation or for the purpose of initiating a proxy
contest with management." In the recent New York decision con-
cerning the Murchison-Kirby contest for control of the Alleghany
Corporation, Justice Markowitz upheld the right of inspection of
the stockholder list for such purpose and stated:
The obtaining of stock lists for the purpose of a proxy fight should be
encouraged where it is genuine. Disclosure by all parties to the stock-
holders of all of the facts can only serve the best interest of a corpora-
tion. To prevent one from knowing who the stockholders are, so that
one's position cannot be effectively presented, is not in keeping with
the right of stockholders to be apprised of the position of competing
groups for management. What may happen in the future, in the event
one or the other side prevails, is entirely up to the stockholders."'
This decision is in accord with an earlier New York decision which
held that a stockholder's right to inspect the stockholder list does
not depend upon whether the shareholder seeks to oust "an arguably
good management or a demonstrably bad one.""8 Similarly, a Dela-
ware decision has granted the right of inspection for the purpose
of ousting the incumbent management. That court rejected a theory
espoused by management that a stockholder would only foment
discussion and cause discord if permitted to circularize informa-
tion among other shareholders. 8
b. Concerning Pending or Proposed Litigation.-Access to the
stockholder list has also been ordered when the purpose is to com-
86 Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 76 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa. 1948), appeal
dismissed, 173 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949); Insuranshares Corp. v. Kinchner, 40 Del. 105,
5 A.2d 519 (1939); Hohman v. Illinois-Iowa Power Co., 305 Ill. App. 17, 26 N.E.2d
420 (1940).
87Murchison v. Alleghany Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 153, 160 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 210
N.Y.S.2d 975 (App. Div. 1961).
88Application of Ditisheim, 96 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
89 Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner, 40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939).
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municate with other shareholders with respect to a derivative sui"'
or with respect to pending or proposed litigation against the cor-
poration.9 However, if the sole purpose is to persuade other stock-
holders to join in the action in order to avoid the necessity of giving
security for costs, inspection has been denied."
c. Concerning Future Actions to be Taken by the Corporation.-It
is generally held that a stockholder seeking inspection of the stock-
holder list in order to communicate with other shareholders regard-
ing plans presented by management, or proposed by himself, is
motivated by a proper purpose." Similarly, a Pennsylvania court has
allowed inspection of the stockholder list for the purpose of forming
a protective committee of shareholders to act in the interest of their
investment." An Alabama court has permitted an inspection when
the purpose was to call a meeting of preferred stockholders in order
to determine what action they could take to enforce payment of
dividends upon preferred stock."5 The Alabama decision was rendered
in spite of a defense by management that it was in the best interest
of the stockholders to retain existing reserves and that the great
majority of the stockholders had previously approved a no-dividend
policy."
2. Curiosity or Harassment of Management
It is the general rule that inspection will be denied where the
only purpose is the gratification of the idle curiosity of a share-
holder,' or where the shareholder merely seeks to annoy or harass
management." However, it has been held that the fact that a director
"oState ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (1941); Brown v.
Central Home Trust Co., 129 N.J.L. 213, 28 A.2d 773 (1942).
" Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co., 35 Cal. App. 283, 169 Pac. 702 (1917); Vigran v.
Hamilton, 321 Il1. App. 541, 53 N.E.2d 250 (1944); White v. Manter, 109 Me. 408, 84
Atl. 890 (1912); Schmidt v. Anderson, 29 N.D. 262, 150 N.W. 871 (1915).
"2Baker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950); Appli-
cation of Joslyn, 78 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1948).
" Chable v. Nicaragua Canal Constr. Co., 59 Fed. 846 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894); Hanrahan
v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955).
'"Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950).
"Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941).
"Id. at 856. Other instances where the inspection of the stockholder list by a stock-
holder may be permitted are: (1) When the purpose of communication is in regard to an
alleged illegal amendment to the corporate charter, McGahan v. United Eng'r Corp., 118
N.J. Eq. 410, 180 Atl. 195 (1935); (2) When the purpose is in regard to a plan of re-
organization proposed by a dissident shareholder, Morris v. United Pierce Dye Works, 137
N.J.L. 262, 59 A.2d 660 (1948); and (3) When the purpose involves an individual share-
holder's plan for retiring preferred stock, Bundy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 38 Ohio Op.
77, 75 N.E.2d 717 (1947).
'"Stone v. Kellogg, 165 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 222 (1896); Commonwealth v. Phoenix Iron
Co., 105 Pa. 111, 51 Am. Rep. 184 (1884); Grayburg Oil Co. v. Jarratt. 16 S.W.2d 319
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929-El Paso).
"Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 Ill. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949); State
ex rel. Paschall v. Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952).
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may bear animosity toward other directors is insufficient proof of
an interest adverse to the corporate interest to warrant a denial of
his right of inspection."'
3. Use by the Shareholder for Commercial or Speculative Reasons
There are many decisions which imply that an inspection will not
be granted if the object is to obtain a stock list for speculative or
commercial purposes,' 0 but unfortunately, the courts have seldom
defined the terms "speculative" and "commercial." In several in-
stances the courts have held that the procurement of a stock list for
the purpose of selling it to a broker or other person is improper, since
such a purpose has no bearing on the corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship."' However, even if there is a possibility that the list will
be used for commercial purposes, if there is an otherwise proper
purpose, inspection will not be denied merely because the shareholder
is a securities dealer."'
Courts are generally in agreement that inspection is entirely proper
for the purpose of making a subsequent offer to purchase the stock
of other shareholders." 3 However, inspection is disallowed when it
is for the purpose of later soliciting stockholders to sell them stock
of another corporation."" Likewise, inspection is denied if the pur-
pose is to prevent the controlling stockholders from selling their
stock and there is no charge of violation of any obligation to the
other shareholders.""
4. Use by Another Corporation or Competitor
If a proper purpose is shown, the fact that a shareholder is a
business competitor, or is in control of a competing corporation, is
"Patent v. Fourth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Misc. 2d 37, 167 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
' State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 37 Del. 514, 115 Atl. 773 (1922); Slay v.
Polonia Pub. Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 434 (1930).
' State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., supra note 100; Eaton v. Manter, 114 Me.
259, 95 At]. 948 (1915). In several states it is a defense to an action for penalties for
failure to permit inspection, where the person suing therefor has within two years sold or
offered for sale any list of shareholders of any corporation, or has aided or abetted any
person in procuring any list of shareholders for any such purpose. See Ala. Bus. Corp. Act §
21(46) (Supp. 1959); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54 (Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-210 (1960); N.D. Cent. Code S
10-19-51 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 180.43 (1957).
' Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass, 586, 126 N.E.2d 499
(1955); Morris v. United Piece Dye Works, 137 N.J.L. 262, 59 A.2d 660 (1948); Bundy
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 38 Ohio Op. 77, 75 N.E.2d 717 (1947).
"03E. L. Bruce Co. v. State, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958); Crouse v. Rogers Park
Apartments, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951); Nationwide Corp. v. North-
western Nati. Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671 (1958); Fiest v. Joseph Dixon
Crucible Co., 30 N.J. Super. 153, 103 A.2d 893 (1954).
"'Chas. A. Day & Co. v. Booth, 123 Me. 443, 123 Atl. 557 (1942); Shea v. Sweetser,
119 Me. 400, 111 Atl. 579 (1920).
"' Bart v. Pine Grove, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 426, 62 N.E.2d 127 (1945).
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no defense to a request to examine the stock list."'0 A recent
Massachusetts case" ' has even granted an inspection when the share-
holder's purposes were (1) to obtain a change in the management
and policies of the corporation, and (2) to turn the stockholder
list over to a committee which was seeking a merger with another
corporation. That court ordered the inspection despite the fact that
the committee was dominated, directed, and financed by the other
corporation. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized
the right of one shareholding corporation to inspect the books of the
corporation which issued the shares-in spite of the fact that the
former was seeking to acquire control of the latter."'e
D. Right To Make Extracts
Of course, the mere inspection of a stockholder list is normally of
little value unless the stockholder making such inspection has the
right to make or obtain a copy of the same. Although there is an
early case to the contrary,'0 ' it now seems to be the universally ac-
cepted rule that the right to inspect the books of a corporation
includes the right to make extracts or copies."' Moreover, it is said
that the denial of the right to copy virtually amounts to a denial of
the right to inspect."' Thus, the right to make extracts is a necessary
incident of the right to inspect, both at common law and under
the statutes."'
The stockholder lists of publicly-owned corporations will normally
constitute rather voluminous records and a stockholder who is per-
mitted to copy the same is frequently confronted with a serious
clerical problem. In the Murchison-Kirby suit, the court provided a
very practical solution by ordering the corporation to furnish the
'° E. L. Bruce & Co. v. State, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958); Mayer v. Cincinnati
Economy Drug Co., 89 Ohio App. 512, 103 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
10' Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955).
108Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 151 Minn, 255, 87 N.W.2d
671 (1958).
". Appeal of Empire Pass. Ry. Co., 134 Pa. 237, 19 Atl. 629 (1890).
..' State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 40 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (1940); Drake v.
Newton Amusement Corp., 123 N.J.L. 560, 9 A.2d 636 (1939); People ex rel. Lorge v.
Consol. Nat'l Bank, 105 App. Div. 537, 94 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1905); Bundy v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 75 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio App. 1947).
... State v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App. 1956).
.. 5 Fletcher, Private Corporations S 2241 (perm. ed. 1952); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 262,
288 (1948). Some statutes specifically grant the right to make extracts: Alaska Comp.
Laws Ann. § 36-2A-54 .(Supp. 1958); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-10 (1953); D.C. Code
Ann. § 29-920 (1961); II. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1954); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38
(1960); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-51 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.246 (1961); Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.44 (1956); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-47 (1961); Wis, Stat. § 180.43
(1957); see also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 46. However, that right is in some instances
limited to copying materials which are essential to the purpose of the shareholder. See
Fletcher, op cit. supra at § 2241.
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stockholder list at the expense of the stockholder."3 In another New
York decision, the stockholder was permitted to obtain a reproduc-
tion of the list from the transfer agent."4
E. Burden Of Proof Of Purpose
Generally, the corporation has the burden of proving impropriety
of purpose on the part of the shareholder."' This is also true in cases
arising under statutes which do not expressly require a proper pur-
pose." ' However, where inspection is sought under the common law
right, there is a difference of opinion as to where the burden of
proof lies."'
In some states, such as Delaware, the status of the burden of proof
depends upon which records are to be inspected. The burden is on
the shareholder if he is seeking to inspect the stock ledger, but if
he is seeking to inspect other books, the burden falls upon the cor-
poration."' The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand, has taken
a minority position by holding that the burden of proof of purpose
under the Illinois general inspection statute is always on the share-
holder." '
F. Corporations Whose Stockholder Lists Are Subject To Inspection
Many jurisdictions require domestic corporations to keep certain
designated records at some particular location within the state. Such
location is usually the corporation's registered office or principal
place of business."' The statutes in eight states call for a particular
location only for the stock ledger."' In addition to the regulations
placed on domestic corporations, New York imposes similar require-
113 Murchison v. Alleghany Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d
975 (App. Div. 1961).
"' Mencher v. Seminole Oil & Gas Corp., 194 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
.. See State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App. 1956); Williams
Coale Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 170 N.E. 434 (1930); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d
11 (1951); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 510 (1939).
"' Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943); Moore v.
Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
... For cases which hold that the burden is on the corporation, see Sanders v. Neely, 197
Miss. 66, 19 So. 2d 424 (1944); State ex rel. Grismer v. Merger Mines Corp., 3 Wash. 2d
417, 101 P.2d 308 (1940). For cases which hold that the burden is on the shareholder, see
State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 42 Del. 73, 28 A.2d 148 (1942); Albee v.
Lamson & Hubbard Corp., 320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946).
"'8 State ex rel. Block v. Sentry Safety Control Corp., 41 Del. 480, 24 A.2d 587 (1942);
State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Atl. 170 (1931).
"" See Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 I1. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
12 For example, see Cal. Corp. Code § 502 (1947); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 155, § 22
(1959).
12' Ark. Star. § 64-219 (1957); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 33-334 (1961); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 8, § 220 (1953); Fla. Stat. § 608.39 (1956); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 172-40 (1955);
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14:5.1 (1937); Tenn. Code Ann. S 48-308 (1955); Utah Bus. Corp.
Act § 16-10-47 (1962).
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ments on foreign corporations doing business in that state."' Other
states merely require foreign corporations to file statements with
their local agent for service of process. These statements must specify
the location of the pertinent records if they are kept outside of the
state.12
Generally, the right of inspection of corporate records extends
to all private corporations. However, in some states since the inspec-
tion statutes are a part of the business corporation chapter or code,
they are inapplicable to certain types of corporations, such as in-
surance companies"' and savings and loan companies.12 Of course,
even in the case of those entities, the stockholder may still have his
common law right of inspection."'
Some of the earlier cases denied shareholders the right to inspect
the books of foreign corporations for various reasons."' However,
it is generally the rule today that such inspection will be allowed if
the foreign corporation is doing business within the state or if its
books are kept in that state."' A court with jurisdiction over a cor-
poration should clearly have the power to order that its books be
made available for inspection even though that court is outside of
the state of incorporation,"' but there has been a conflict in the
decisions as to whether the law of the domicile of the corporation or
the law of the forum is to be applied. 3 '
G. The Effect Of By-Law Or Charter Provisions On Inspection
Rights
Courts are in agreement that corporations may not deny the share-
holder his right of inspection by any provision of the charter or by-
laws. The right may be reasonably regulated in those documents as
122N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 133.
12La. Rev. Stat. § 12:206 (1950); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.16 (1951).
124 Lehman v. National Benefit Ins. Co., 243 Iowa 1348, 53 N.W.2d 872 (1952).
"25 State ex rel. Schomberg v. Home Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 220 Wis. 649, 265 N.W.
701 (1936).
126Doggett v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 396 Il. 354, 71 N.E.2d 686 (1947).
127 See Note, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 677 (1937) for a list of the cases.
128 See Gertridge v. State Capital Co., 129 Cal. App. 86, 18 P.2d 375 (1933); Stoopack
v. George A. Fuller Co., 18 Misc. 2d 977, 190 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 191 N.Y.S.2d
356 (App. Div. 1959) (where the foreign corporation was doing business within the state);
Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
249 N.Y. Supp. 993 (App. Div. 1931) (where the books were within the state); Machen
v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212, 85 Atl. 100 (1912).
121 See Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 250 Minn. 265, 84 N.W.2d 919 (1957).
"' Stoopack v. George A. Fuller Co., 18 Misc. 2d 977, 190 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 191 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1959); State ex rel. Grismer v. Merger Mines Corp.,
3 Wash. 2d 417, 101 P.2d 308 (1940). The law of the forum is applied where the statute
is construed as applicable to foreign corporations. Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co.,
365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141
P.2d 571 (1943).
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to the time and manner of an inspection in order to curtail any
interference with the efficient management of the company.' Never-
theless, restrictive by-law provisions are usually construed in favor
of the right of inspection, rather than against it.13 For example, in
a recent Louisiana case stock was issued under a charter amendment
which denied a particular class of stock any right or privilege to
participate or vote in the affairs or the management of the company.
The court held that such a charter provision could not be construed
to restrict a shareholder's right to inspect the books."
Many corporations, particularly those incorporated in Delaware,
still have provisions in their by-laws denying the right of inspection
of corporate records except as conferred by statute or by resolution
of the board of directors. Although such provisions have been de-
clared invalid,134 it has been pointed out that as late as 1946 out of
one hundred of the country's largest corporations, all but two of
the twenty-seven which were incorporated in Delaware contained
in their charters or by-laws a provision of this nature. The retention
of these provisions apparently is for the purpose of enabling man-
agement to confront a shareholder seeking inspection with a prima
facie defense, the invalidity of which is perhaps unknown to the
shareholder."3
H. Procedure
A writ of mandamus is considered to be the proper procedural
remedy for enforcement of a stockholder's right of inspection. 0
Since the writ of mandamus was abolished by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.. most cases involving attempts by stockholders
to inspect the stockholder list have arisen in state courts. In fact,
federal decisions have denied the right of inspection for the reason
that the writ of mandamus was abolished from the federal procedural
remedies."' However, there should be no reason why the right could
not be enforced in a proceeding in a federal court under the dis-
'3' State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257 (1926); Klotz
v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N.E. 764 (1950).
1"3 Hodgens v. United Copper Co., 67 Atl. 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1907).
"' State ex rel. Wolfner v. Fairfax Shipside Storage, Inc., 93 So. 2d 336 (La. App.
1957).
134 See cases cited note 131 supra.
133 Hornstein, Right of Stockholders in New York Courts, 56 Yale L.J. 942, 946
(1947); Koenigsberg, Provisions in Corporate Charters and By-Laws Governing the Inspec-
tion of Books by Stockholders, 30 Geo. L.J. 227, 247 (1942).
.3 13 Am. Jur. Corporations § 444-49; 5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations §5 2250
to -55.1 (1952).
137 Fed. R. Civ. P. 81 (b).
138 E.g., Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Toomey v.
Wichwire Spencer Steel Co., 3 F.R.D. 243 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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covery rules if the action is for a purpose other than that of merely
obtaining the stockholder list.
The injunctive remedy has been used successfully in two interest-
ing decisions. In Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co.,1"' a share-
holder sought to inspect the stockholder list under a general inspec-
tion statute, but he was denied the right. Ten days before the annual
meeting of shareholders he sought to inspect the stockholder list
under the applicable voting list statute. He was permitted to make
an inspection and to make extracts, but there was insufficient time
before the shareholders' meeting to complete the reproducing pro-
cess. Accordingly, he sought and obtained an injunction which
delayed the holding of the annual meeting until he had time to
complete the stockholder list and to communicate with the other
shareholders. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that
a temporary injunction was the proper remedy to restrain manage-
ment from making any proxy solicitations until the plaintiff had an
opportunity to copy the stockholder list. In that case the court
ordered the list produced by a writ of mandamus.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
The statutes which restrict the right of inspection of corporate
records to stockholders who meet some holding period or percentage
of ownership requirement, should provide a welcome decrease in
the number of attempted inspections for improper purposes. Un-
fortunately, there is a noticeable absence of any such requirements
in all of the voting list statutes.
The statutes which provide penalties for corporations or their
officers for failure to comply with proper requests for inspection
should promote a decrease in the number of unwarranted refusals
to permit inspection of stockholder lists. However, those statutes with
penalties which consist of nominal fines are probably of little effect.
Moreover, since corporate by-laws frequently indemnify officers
from liability except for willful misconduct, the penalties which are
presently designed to reach officers individually are of questionable
effectiveness.
Many corporate officers, due to their reluctance to divulge in-
formation which could result in the loss of their jobs, will un-
doubtedly continue to attempt to delay and frustrate inspection of
stockholder lists. Of course, enterprising stockholders of corpora-
1973 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa. 1948), appeal dismissed, 173 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949).
140 Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d
671 (1958).
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tions which transact business in a number of states are frequently
in a flexible enough position that they can defeat any delaying tactics
by management. These shareholders can select a jurisdiction for an
action to enforce their right of inspection on the basis of the most
effective of the laws of several states.
Finally, it should be noted that any stockholder is capable of
making a written demand for inspection and of stating a purpose
which has been held by the courts to be proper. However, the suc-
cess of such attempts to inspect stockholder lists will naturally con-
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